A defining characteristic of modern China is its incorporation into global systems. Whether one speaks of military, political, economic or cultural trends, China became an ever-greater participant in interna tional currents over the course of the 20th century. In recent years there has been a great deal of study of the challenges posed by China's seemingly recent "emergence," but very little scholarly appreciation of longer-term processes of China's internationalization.
The longer term, it is true, is much longer than the history of the China's Internationalization in the Early PRC History, recovers China's active participation in networks of international exchange that "stretched from Syria in the west to Japan in the east and from Korea in the north to Indonesia in the south, and which, by the 16th century, included Europe and the New World." In the process she deals with China's transformation by, and of, both religious waves (such as Buddhism) and global trading patterns (as with Latin American silver).2 Well before this new wave of scholarship, the work of Morris Rossabi and others had already done much to refine the textbook conception of an immutable Sinocentrism in the working of traditional China's relations with its neighbours.
Historians of more recent times have long discussed the compara tive role of forces external and internal to China in the shaping of its modern history. They have done so in debates that sometimes echo those many decades ago in Europe, which argued either for a Primat der Au?enpolitik as the motive force of a nation's history or alternatively for the primacy of domestic politics even in the setting of foreign policy.3 Yet the study of modern China in the West has never been burdened by a focus on foreign policy -and the actions of foreign policy elites -to the exclusion of other factors. John Fairbank shaped the question of a Chinese "response" to the West without writing a straightforward diplomatic history and without over simplifying the complex and contradictory set of actors that comprised "the West."4 In Fairbank's professional youth, the study of modern China's foreign relations was at the centre of modern historical studies of China, both in the West and in China, where his teacher, Professor T.
F. Tsiang (Jiang Tingfu ?lSlJf?), set the standard in the writing of modern international history.5 Diplomatic history in particular exemplified the best of Chinese historiography,6 and this tradition has been well maintained.7 Yet this is a field in Chinese studies that stagnated in the West from the 1960s on. In recent decades the study of China's international relations has been overshadowed, in both
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Unlike the leading works in those fields, most of the standard monographs on China's foreign relations were written before the opening of Republican-era archives in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and on Taiwan. Thus there exists no standard work in the West on the international political relations of 20th-century China that makes extensive use of Chinese and foreign diplomatic archives. The realms of economic and cultural relations similarly lack an integrated treatment.8 The present Western-language literature on China's foreign relations is heavily weighted towards the foreign policy of the contemporary PRC government, and even here there are but few works that offers a synthetic and historical overview.9 The best study of China's foreign relations in all their dimensions, for historical and contemporary times -J?rgen Osterhammel's China und the Weltgesellschaft -has no English-language translation, and so its readership is unfortunately restricted.10 And while many have studied the conflicts that have emerged over time in China's foreign political relations, few have focused on patterns of interaction, interp?n?tra tion and co-operation across national boundaries that have proved at least as important.11
Yet the history of the PRC is simply incomprehensible without a strongly international perspective. Its ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was the creation of a foreign power, and it began its rule of the country under foreign protection. The early PRC was a leading actor in a global revolutionary movement as well as in a military-political-economic alliance that stretched from Berlin to Canton. Internally, its system of government was self-consciously modelled on that of its foreign allies. And the lives of its 600 million subjects would be changed by the application of imported models of social, political and even cultural revolution. At best, the lines between things international, global or external on the one hand, and things "Chinese" on the other hand, became in many realms nearly impossible to draw. In order to study this era of China's international history, we cannot separate the internal from the external; rather, we should aim to examine processes of internationalization at home and abroad. This is not to suggest that international influences were imposed upon China in this period. If PRC foreign policy evinced a tension China's Internationalization in the Early PRC between communist internationalism and Chinese national interest, policies were nevertheless set by Chinese leaders whose own careers had been at once internationalist and nationalist. Within China, it was not the imposition, but the internalization of international cultural practices, be these of political activity, economic organization, legal and prison systems or whatever, caused at least as much by "agency" on the part of Chinese actors as by international "influence." How else, for example, can we understand the durability of certain strands of Western political thought in China, not the least important of which is Leninism, which to this day allows the People's Republic to survive as the world's last significant communist state? As suggested below, a Chinese leader's political worldview -itself as much international as "Chinese" -would go far towards determining the fate of the early PRC's most important international relationship.
Although both the internal and the external aspects of Chinese foreign relations require dealing with transnational and intercultural interactions -cultural, economic or political -I prefer the term "internationalization" to (for example) "globalization" for a very simple reason. States and governments matter, critically, to the private as well as the public dimensions of Chinese foreign relations in the 20th century, which took place in settings that were inescapably inter-national, across recognized (albeit sometimes disputed) national frontiers. And states and governments mediated, regulated and registered an ever-growing percentage of the activities of non-state actors.
A single essay cannot hope to address all these issues in the history of the early People's Republic. This article focuses on a topic in which all dimensions of China's international relations come into play in one measure or another: China's role in the socialist world economy during the 1950s and early 1960s. As most recent work on Sino-Soviet relations has focused primarily on external political relations,12 it should be useful to explore the multiple, and ultimately political, dimensions of China's international economic relations, the alter native directions of which were stated starkly by Nikita Khrushchev in 195913:
If we want to speak of the future, it seems to me that the further development of the socialist countries will in all probability proceed along lines of reinforcing a 12. This gap in our scholarship has now begun to be addressed in a series of ally, a distinction earned in blood in Korea and by the fact that, unlike the Eastern European "people's democracies," the PRC's allegiance was not bought at gunpoint.
Michael Sheng has argued that the CCP that took power was in a fundamental sense not "nationalist," as it lacked a core conception of a "Chinese nation" defined principally by borders, ethnicity or China's Internationalization in the Early PRC language. It drew lines instead along class boundaries, limited "the people" to those on whose loyalty it could count, and placed the party-state on a higher moral plane than the nation-state. Thus despite its nationalist rhetoric, the CCP, "born pro-Soviet," could support the interests of the "proletarian state" of the USSR over the interests of the Chinese Republic, which the CCP sought to destroy.18
As later events would show, this was an internationalism that could go beyond fealty to the Soviet founder to something more properly described, as Chen Jian has suggested, as universalism.19
In economics as in politics, it was never the aim of the PRC Still, by 1950, there were strong reasons to explore a Sino-Soviet alliance that went beyond ideological affinity or strategic partnership.
In economic development in general and industrial development in 31. Extra-territorial rights were indeed relinquished for White Russians in China. But with the Soviet nationalization of all facets of foreign relations -economic and cultural as well as political and military -there were no "private" activities for Soviet citizens in China, who were under the authority of the Soviet Embassy and therefore, the USSR claimed, were entitled to diplomatic immunity. This was made more explicit upon the Nationalist experience but was -to cite Michael Sheng again -even more fundamentally "a logical extension of the history of CCP-Moscow relations in the decades prior to the proclamation of the PRC in 1949."36 Domestically, for much of its first decade, the People's Republic was a more attentive student of Soviet models in state-building -in the construction of its political, legal, educational and cultural infrastructures -than the CCP ever had been of Comintern approaches to revolution.37 In the PRC's domestic political arrange ments, for example, Soviet models were omnipresent. Mao and his colleagues followed, sometimes against Mao's own initial judgements, Stalin's suggestions that the PRC needed a "coalition government" as an initial fa?ade for party dictatorship; it needed elections to the Political Consultative Conference; and ultimately it had to have (and would have, in 1954) a constitution modelled largely on the USSR's The post-revolutionary political apparatus superimposed following liberation was essentially identical to the Soviet structure upon which it was patterned. The elites who led these revolutions shared the same general ideological outlooks as well as the specific objective of modernization without the putative inequities of capitalism. They fully expected their developmental paths to converge in the course of socialist modernization and the eventual realization of socialism.39
In so doing China was entering a broader, young community of socialist states, each of which was similarly emulating the Soviet Union in this, its most exaggerated phase of "high Stalinism." The new world economy that China now joined had great ambitions and serious structural weaknesses. A Soviet article of Apart from the fact that the economic history of the socialist bloc would hardly be devoid of crises in the 1950s -the chronic malaise of Soviet agriculture and the catastrophic collapse of China's agriculture at the end of the decade, among them -the socialist world had several built-in disadvantages. First, it consisted primarily of the less affluent and more war-damaged countries of Eurasia. The economic division of the world disrupted previous patterns of trade with more advanced Western economies. Thus the two major trade blocs in the post-war period enjoyed more similar levels of development within each and would be more "horizontally" integrated than the more vertically integrated trading patterns of the pre-war decades. Secondly, the use of trade to integrate centrally planned economies was particularly difficult in an environment in which domestic prices were insulated from international markets and the currencies effectively non transferable or non-convertible one with another, not to mention with the "hard" currencies of the West. Thirdly, the political economy of Stalinism that emphasized absolute party control and centralized economic planning in a national setting meant that socialist economic co-operation began, and for the most part remained, set in a series of bilateral agreements, without an integrated, multilateral vision of the bloc as an economic whole. Only with Stalin's death would there emerge efforts to promote specialization and trade within the bloc.54 Fourthly, as the economic reorientation of the late 1940s diminished trade with the capitalist countries and redirected it to socialist comrades, the international divisions of labour achieved in pre-war markets could not easily be replicated in socialist ones. Indeed, with every socialist country operating five-(or more) year plans, with each plan "cast in precisely the same pattern,"55 there were new disincen tives to trade. With each member emphasizing heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods and agriculture, the original bias in the Soviet model towards autarky could only be reinforced; hence simply massive, and, although it was not free, it was given on better terms than could then have been found from any other source -even if China had (as it clearly did not) alternative sources for credit, advice and investment.60 For the Soviet Union, itself still a net importer of capital goods in 1954, industrial exports to China competed with domestic demand and East European markets for the same goods. 61 While Chinese foreign trade officials noted that prices of certain commodities differed from those on the world market, overall and over many years the financial calculations of Sino-Soviet trade were deemed "reasonable and fair."62 This is despite the fact that China, in importing capital goods only from the Eastern bloc, was in a "seller's market" and normally would have been forced to be a "price-taker."
Soviet prices to China of certain commodities were higher than those of the same goods when exported to the West,63 but as Feng-hwa Mah has shown, barter ratios for Soviet industrial equipment were "clearly to China's advantage as far as its industrial programme" was concerned. Where else in the world could China get five tons of steel products for one ton of frozen pork? Or a steel-pipe factory for 10,000 tons of tobacco?64 Moreover, there is little evidence that Moscow used its bargaining power to a comprehensive economic advantage.65 For example, Soviet technical assistance was never measured according to world market equivalents. Indeed, the concept of intellectual property was so alien to the Soviet bloc that scientific-technical documentation, including blueprints, was provided without direct compensation, as noted in the Sino-Soviet economic agreement of 15 May 1953. China was charged for the physical machinery, but the technology was basically free. For its part, the Chinese government was contracted to reimburse Moscow for only 50 per cent of the estimated costs of Soviet technical advisors in China. And if the international value of the ruble was overstated in Sino-Soviet agreements, given the very low interest rates of Soviet credits (never more than 2 per cent per annum), there can be little doubt that China fared very well indeed under the
